Analyzing a nail-biting election

Donald G. Saari ()
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Donald G. Saari: Department of Economics and of Mathematics, University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA 92717-5100, USA

Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, vol. 18, issue 3, 415-430

Abstract: Using Brams and Fishburn's report and data, the SC&W election is analyzed with an emphasis on explaining the theoretical reasons for the conflicting outcomes. In the process, some new results are obtained.

Date: 2001-07-12
Note: Received: 20 June 2000/Accepted: 26 March 2001
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