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The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting

Moshé Machover () and Dan S. Felsenthal ()
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Dan S. Felsenthal: University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa 31905, Israel

Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, vol. 18, issue 3, 431-464

Abstract: We analyse and evaluate three decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU, which are prescribed by the `definitive form' of the Treaty of Nice. The first will apply from 2005 to the present 15-member EU, if it will not have been enlarged by then. The second or third will apply to an enlarged 27-member EU. We conclude that the first of these is an improvement on the current decision rule; but the other two have extremely undesirable features.

Date: 2001-07-12
Note: Received: 23 February 2001/Accepted: 26 March 2001
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