Aggregation of coarse preferences

Hervé Crès

Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, vol. 18, issue 3, 507-525

Abstract: We consider weak preference orderings over a set An of n alternatives. An individual preference is of refinement \ell\leqn if it first partitions An into \ell subsets of `tied' alternatives, and then ranks these subsets within a linear ordering. When \ell

Date: 2001-07-12
Note: Received: 29 June 1999/Accepted: 25 February 2000
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Related works:
Working Paper: Aggregation of Coarse Preferences (2000)
Working Paper: Aggregation of Coarse Preferences (1998)
Working Paper: Aggregation of Coarse Preferences (1998)
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