The political viability of a negative income tax

Jon R. Neill
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Jon R. Neill: Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008, USA

Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, vol. 18, issue 4, 747-757

Abstract: This paper offers three propositions relating to the political viability of the negative income tax. One, despite its work disincentive, a majority of households would support a linear income tax that makes cash payments to low income households. However two, when government consumption is sufficiently high, a majority would favor a proportional tax over such a tax. Three, under certain conditions, a majority of households will prefer public provision of a private good or an in-kind transfer to a negative income tax. These latter two propositions offer an explanation for the public's apparent distaste for widespread cash transfers.

Date: 2001-10-08
Note: Received: 17 September 1999/Accepted: 21 April 2000
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