Core concepts for share vectors

Gerard van der Laan and Rene van den Brink ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, vol. 18, issue 4, 759-784

Abstract: A value mapping for cooperative games with transferable utilities is a mapping that assigns to every game a set of vectors each representing a distribution of the payoffs. A value mapping is efficient if to every game it assigns a set of vectors which components all sum up to the worth that can be obtained by all players cooperating together. An approach to efficiently allocate the worth of the `grand coalition' is using share mappings which assign to every game a set of share vectors being vectors which components sum up to one. Every component of a share vector is the corresponding players' share in the total payoff that is to be distributed among the players. In this paper we discuss a class of share mappings containing the (Shapley) share-core, the Banzhaf share-core and the Large Banzhaf share-core, and provide characterizations of this class of share mappings.

Date: 2001-10-08
Note: Received: 9 August 1999/Accepted: 25 April 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/1018004/10180759.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
Working Paper: Core Concepts for Share Vectors (1999)
Working Paper: Core Concepts for Share Vectors (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:4:p:759-784

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().