Single-peaked preferences with several commodities

Pablo Amoros

Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 19, issue 1, 57-67

Abstract: We consider the problem of allocating m commodities among n agents with single-peaked preferences. When m\geq2 and n=2 any strategy-proof and efficient solution is dictatorial. We propose an extension of the Uniform Rule that (in the two-agents case) is the only one that satisfies strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, and a weak requirement related to efficiency. Alternatively, the envy-freeness property may be replaced by weak-anonymity.

Date: 2002-01-21
Note: Received: 7 November 1997/Accepted: 1 August 2000
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Working Paper: - SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES WITH SEVERAL COMMODITIES (1998)
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