On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules

Arkadii Slinko ()
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Arkadii Slinko: Department of Mathematics, The University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, New Zealand

Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 19, issue 2, 313-324

Abstract: In this paper we prove that the plurality rule and the run-off procedure are asymptotically strategy-proof for any number of alternatives and that the proportion of profiles, at which a successful attempt to manipulate might take place, is in both cases bounded from above by $K/\sqrt n$, where n is the number of participating agents and K does not depend on n. We also prove that for the plurality rule the proportion of manipulable profiles is asymptotically bounded from below by $k/\sqrt n$, where k also does not depend on n.

Date: 2002-04-10
Note: Received: 10 February 2000/Accepted: 19 October 2000
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