Different least square values, different rankings

Vincent Merlin () and Annick Laruelle ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 19, issue 3, 533-550

Abstract: The semivalues (as well as the least square values) propose different linear solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility. As a byproduct, they also induce a ranking of the players. So far, no systematic analysis has studied to which extent these rankings could vary for different semivalues. The aim of this paper is to compare the rankings given by different semivalues or least square values for several classes of games. Our main result states that there exist games, possibly superadditive or convex, such that the rankings of the players given by several semivalues are completely different. These results are similar to the ones D. Saari discovered in voting theory: There exist profiles of preferences such that there is no relationship among the rankings of the candidates given by different voting rules.

Date: 2002-07-08
Note: Received: 5 November 2000/Accepted: 12 February 2001
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