Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules

Lin Zhou and Stephen Ching ()
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Stephen Ching: Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, HONG KONG

Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 19, issue 3, 569-580

Abstract: In this paper we introduce a new definition of strategy-proofness for multi-valued social choice correspondences. We prove two Gibbard-Satterthwaite type results for strategy-proof social choice correspondences. These results show that allowing multiple outcomes as social choices will not necessarily lead to an escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem.

Date: 2002-07-08
Note: Received: 24 January 2001/Accepted: 19 March 2001
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