A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution

Walter Trockel

Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 19, issue 3, 586 pages

Abstract: This paper follows van Damme (1986) in presenting a meta bargaining approach that justifies the Nash bargaining solution. But in contrast to van Damme's procedure our meta bargaining game is universal in the sense that all bargaining solutions are allowed as strategic choices in the meta bargaining game. Also our result holds true for any number n of players.

Date: 2002-07-08
Note: Received: 31 July 2000/Accepted: 19 March 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/2019003/20190581.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:3:p:581-586

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().