A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice
Estelle Cantillon and
Antonio Rangel ()
Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 19, issue 3, 587-611
Abstract:
We use a simple graphical approach to represent Social Welfare Functions that satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Anonymity. This approach allows us to provide simple and illustrative proofs of May's Theorem, of variants of classic impossibility results, and of a recent result on the robustness of Majority Rule due to Maskin (1995). In each case, geometry provides new insights on the working and interplay of the axioms, and suggests new results including a new characterization of the entire class of Majority Rule SWFs, a strengthening of May's Theorem, and a new version of Maskin's Theorem.
Date: 2002-07-08
Note: Received: 31 July 1999/Accepted: 27 March 2001
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Working Paper: A Graphical Analysis of Some Basic Results in Social Choice (2001) 
Working Paper: A Graphical Analysis of Some Basic Results in Social Choice (2000) 
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