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Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies

Miki Kato and Shinji Ohseto ()
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Miki Kato: Department of Social Welfare, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Hachioji, Tokyo 192-0397, Japan
Shinji Ohseto: Faculty of Economics, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Hachioji, Tokyo 192-0397, Japan

Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 19, issue 3, 659-664

Abstract: We study the possibility of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms in pure exchange economies. In his remarkable paper, Zhou (1991) establishes an elegant impossibility result: there is no strategy-proof, efficient, and non-dictatorial mechanism in the two-agent case. He conjectures that there is no strategy-proof, efficient, and "non-inversely-dictatorial" mechanism in the case of three or more agents. However, we discover some counterexamples to his conjecture in the case of four or more agents. We present a new interesting open question: Is there any strategy-proof, efficient, and "non-alternately-dictatorial" mechanism?

Date: 2002-07-08
Note: Received: 17 October 2000/Accepted: 20 April 2001
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