Anonymity, ordinal preference proximity and imposed social choices

Daniel Eckert () and Benjamin Lane ()
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Benjamin Lane: Institute of Public Economics, University of Graz, Universitätsstrasse 15, A-3010 Graz, Austria

Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 19, issue 3, 684 pages

Abstract: Extending on an impossibility result by Baigent [1], it is shown that an anonymous social choice procedure which preserves preference proximity cannot satisfy the weakest possible form of non-imposition.

Date: 2002-07-08
Note: Received: 20 September 1999/Accepted: 11 May 2001
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