The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures

Shasikanta Nandeibam ()
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Shasikanta Nandeibam: Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK

Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 19, issue 3, 685-705

Abstract: We consider probabilistic voting procedures which map each feasible set of alternatives and each utility profile to a social choice lottery over the feasible set. It is shown that if we impose: (i) a probabilistic collective rationality condition known as regularity; (ii) probabilistic counterpart of Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives and citizens' sovereignty; (iii) a probabilistic positive association condition called monotonicity; then the coalitional power structure under a probabilistic voting procedure is characterized by weak random dictatorship.

Date: 2002-07-08
Note: Received: 1 March 1999/Accepted: 21 May 2001
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