Characterizations of two power indices for voting games with r alternatives

Edward M. Bolger
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Edward M. Bolger: Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Miami University, 123 Bachelor Hall, Oxford, Ohio, 45056-1641, USA

Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 19, issue 4, 709-721

Abstract: In the first three sections of this paper we present a set of axioms which provide a characterization of an extension of the Banzhaf index to voting games with r alternatives, such as the United Nations Security Council where a nation can vote "yes", "no", or "abstain". The fourth section presents a set of axioms which characterizes a power index based on winning sets instead of pivot sets.

Date: 2002-10-09
Note: Received: 4 April 2000/Accepted: 30 April 2001
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