Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems

Claus-Jochen Haake (), Matthias G. Raith () and Francis Edward Su ()
Additional contact information
Matthias G. Raith: Department of Economics, University of Magdeburg, P.O. Box 4120, 39016 Magdeburg, Germany
Francis Edward Su: Department of Mathematics, Harvey Mudd College, Claremont, CA 91711, USA

Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 19, issue 4, 723-749

Abstract: We develop a procedure for implementing an efficient and envy-free allocation of m objects among n individuals with the possibility of monetary side-payments, assuming that players have quasi-linear utility functions. The procedure eliminates envy by compensating envious players. It is fully descriptive and says explicitly which compensations should be made, and in what order. Moreover, it is simple enough to be carried out without computer support. We formally characterize the properties of the procedure, show how it establishes envy-freeness with minimal resources, and demonstrate its application to a wide class of fair-division problems.

Date: 2002-10-09
Note: Received: 6 March 2000/Accepted: 21 May 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/2019004/20190723.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:4:p:723-749

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().