Monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions on convex games

Toru Hokari ()
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Toru Hokari: Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Yoshida-Honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan

Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 19, issue 4, 825-844

Abstract: It is well known that on the domain of convex games, the Dutta-Ray solution satisfies many desirable properties such as population-monotonicity, max consistency, converse max consistency, and conditional self-consistency. In this paper, we define a family of possibly non-symmetric and non-homogeneous generalizations of the Dutta-Ray solution, which we refer to as "monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions." We show that above four properties are preserved by our generalizations.

Date: 2002-10-09
Note: Received: 25 August 2000/Accepted: 11 September 2001
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