Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria

Sang-Chul Suh

Social Choice and Welfare, 2003, vol. 20, issue 1, 33-39

Abstract: In a marriage problem, we introduce a condition called "exclusive matchability (EM)": the condition mainly says that each pair of a man and a woman can choose to be a matching pair regardless of others' actions. This condition is essential to strong Nash implementation of the stable rule. We show that any mechanism which satisfies exclusive matchability implements the stable rule in strong Nash equilibria.

Date: 2003-01-13
Note: Received: 17 May 1999/Accepted: 30 August 2001
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