On the Arrow and Wilson impossibility theorems

Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly

Social Choice and Welfare, 2003, vol. 20, issue 2, 273-281

Abstract: A social welfare function is Arrovian if it is transitive-valued and satisfies IIA. We examine the logical relation between the statements (A) If f is Arrovian with domain F then it is dictatorial if it satisfies the Pareto criterion and (W) If f is Arrovian with domain F then it is dictatorial or inversely dictatorial if it is non-null and satisfies non-imposition. We exhibit a class of domains on which W implies A and another on which A implies W. We also present examples of domains on which one of the statements is true and the other is false. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1007/s003550200181

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