Banks winners in tournaments are difficult to recognize

Gerhard J. Woeginger

Social Choice and Welfare, 2003, vol. 20, issue 3, 523-528

Abstract: Given a tournament T, a Banks winner of T is the top vertex of any maximal (with respect to inclusion) transitive subtournament of T. In this technical note, we show that the problem of deciding whether some fixed vertex v is a Banks winner for T is NP-complete. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1007/s003550200197

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