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The optimal majority with an endogenous status quo

Sam Bucovetsky ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2003, vol. 21, issue 1, 148 pages

Abstract: Using the voting procedure proposed by Baron (1996), the consequences are examined of changing the majority required to change legislation. When the majority required is greater than fifty percent, and when voters behave strategically, the first policy proposed (on a stationary equilibrium path) is never defeated subsequently. Which policy gets proposed first depends on which voter gets to make the first proposal. But increasing the required majority induces a mean–preserving spread on the distribution of these policies, if voters' types are distributed symmetrically. Thus before the voting procedure begins, voters would prefer unanimously to see the required majority reduced. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2003

Date: 2003
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Working Paper: The Optimal Majority with an Endogenous Status Quo (1995)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0208-z

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