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A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings

Biung-Ghi Ju ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2003, vol. 21, issue 3, 469-499

Date: 2003
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Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

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