Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
David Cantala ()
Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, vol. 22, issue 3, 514 pages
Abstract:
The work examines strategy-proof social choice functions which select a level or the location of a public good when its consumption is not compulsory. We assume that agents have single-peaked preferences on the consumption of the public good as well as a reservation utility. Agents opt out of the good whenever they get a utility smaller than their reservation utility. We characterize strategy-proof and efficient social choice functions as well as the ones which are anonymous and group strategy-proof. Finally, we observe that for given preferences a Condorcet winner may not exist. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:22:y:2004:i:3:p:491-514
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0228-8
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