Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003
Dan S Felsenthal () and
Moshé Machover ()
Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, vol. 23, issue 1, 1-20
We analyse and evaluate the qualified majority (QM) decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU that are included in the Draft Constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention . We use a method similar to the one we used in  for the QM prescriptions made in the Treaty of Nice. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004
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