Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations

Annick Laruelle () and Federico Valenciano ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, vol. 24, issue 1, 197 pages

Abstract: In this paper we propose a simple model for measuring ‘success’ or ‘decisiveness’ in voting situations. For an assessment of these features two inputs are claimed to be necessary: the voting rule and the voters’ behavior. The voting rule specifies when a proposal is to be accepted or rejected depending on the resulting vote configuration. Voting behavior is summarized by a distribution of probability over the vote configurations. This basic model provides a clear common conceptual basis for reinterpreting different power indices and some related game theoretic notions coherently from a unified point of view. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2005

Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0298-7

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