Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem

Daniel Berend and Luba Sapir ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, vol. 24, issue 1, 83-92

Abstract: Consider a committee of experts dealing with dichotomous choice problem, where the correctness probabilities are all greater than [InlineMediaObject not available: see fulltext.] We prove that, if a random subcommittee of odd size m is selected randomly, and entrusted to make a decision by majority vote, its probability of deciding correctly increases with m. This includes a result of Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2000), who proved that a random subcommittee of size m≥3 is preferable to a random single expert. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2005

Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-003-0293-z (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:24:y:2005:i:1:p:83-92

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0293-z

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().