The optimal design of fallible organizations: invariance of optimal decision criterion and uniqueness of hierarchy and polyarchy structures

Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, vol. 25, issue 1, 207-220

Date: 2005
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Working Paper: The Optimal Design of Fallible Organizations: Invariance of Optimal Decision Criterion and Uniqueness of Hierarchy and Polyarchy Structures (2004)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-005-0055-1

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