Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study

Karine Van der Straeten (), Jean-François Laslier, Nicolas Sauger and André Blais

Social Choice and Welfare, 2010, vol. 35, issue 3, 435-472

Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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Working Paper: Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study (2009)
Working Paper: Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study (2009)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0448-7

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