Subgroup independence conditions on preferences

Juan Candeal ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2012, vol. 39, issue 4, 847-853

Abstract: The concept of n-scale independence is introduced for a preference relation defined on $${\mathbb{R}^{n}=\mathbb{R}^{n_{1}}\times \cdots \times \mathbb{R}^{n_{p}}}$$ . In addition to zero-independence and upper semicontinuity at zero, n-scale independence allows us to characterizate linear oligarchies as well as to offer a (semi)continuous welfarist analogue of Wilson’s theorem. We also include a characterization of the class of continuous, n-separable and n-scale independent, p ≥ 3, social orderings in terms of what we call homogeneous oligarchies. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0558-x

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