A new old solution for weak tournaments

Vincent Anesi

Social Choice and Welfare, 2012, vol. 39, issue 4, 919-930

Abstract: This article uncovers dynamic properties of the von Neumann–Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games. We propose a new procedure for the construction of choice sets from weak tournaments, based on dynamic stability criteria. The idea is to analyze dynamic versions of tournament games. The exploration of a specific class of Markov perfect equilibria in these “dynamic tournament games” yields a new solution concept for weak tournaments—the A-stable set. The alternatives in an A-stable set constitute persistent, long-run policy outcomes in the corresponding dynamic tournament games. We find that, in any weak tournament, the class of A-stable sets coincides with that of von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

Date: 2012
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Working Paper: A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments (2010)
Working Paper: A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments (2010)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0561-2

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