Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules
Jun Iritani,
Tomoyuki Kamo and
Ryo-ichi Nagahisa
Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, vol. 40, issue 1, 155-171
Abstract:
A binary relation is indifference-transitive if its symmetric part satisfies the transitivity axiom. We investigated the properties of Arrovian aggregation rules that generate acyclic and indifference-transitive social preferences. We proved that there exists unique vetoer in the rule if the number of alternatives is greater than or equal to four. We provided a classification of decisive structures in aggregation rules where the number of alternatives is equal to three. Furthermore, we showed that the coexistence of a vetoer and a tie-making group, which generates social indifference, is inevitable if the rule satisfies the indifference unanimity. The relationship between the vetoer and the tie-making group, i.e., whether the vetoer belongs to the tie-making group or not, determines the power structure of the rule. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:1:p:155-171
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0591-9
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