EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences

Tomohiko Kawamori

Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, vol. 40, issue 1, 27-40

Abstract: This article considers a legislative bargaining model in which the rejecter in the previous round becomes the proposer in the current round. We allow the time and risk preferences to differ across players and the voting quota to be a supermajority or submajority. We show that there exists a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and that each player’s equilibrium payoff conditional on being a proposer is unique, and we explicitly derive the equilibria and equilibrium payoff. We compare a proposer’s equilibrium payoff when the time interval between two consecutive rounds tends to zero with respect to the protocols of the selection of proposers and the voting quota: we show that a proposer’s equilibrium payoff can be greater in this article’s rejecter-proposer model than in the Baron–Ferejohn random-proposer model; even though the voting quota increases, a proposer’s equilibrium payoff can increase. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-011-0567-9 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:1:p:27-40

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().

 
Page updated 2019-05-21
Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:1:p:27-40