The majority rule with a chairman

Antonio Quesada

Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, vol. 40, issue 3, 679-691

Abstract: For the case of two alternatives and a given finite set of at least three individuals, seven axioms are shown to characterize the rules that are either the relative majority rule or the relative majority in which a given individual, the chairman, can always break ties. An axiomatization of the relative majority rules with a chairman is suggested that holds for an even number of individuals and that, for an odd number of individuals, characterizes the rules that are either the relative majority rule or a relative majority rule with a chairman. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0633-3

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