A new single transferable vote method and its axiomatic justification

Fuad Aleskerov and Alexander Karpov

Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, vol. 40, issue 3, 786 pages

Abstract: We propose a new method for conducting Single transferable vote (STV) elections and provide a unified method for describing classic STV procedures (the Gregory Method, the inclusive Gregory method and the Weighted inclusive Gregory method) as an iterative procedure. We also propose a modification for quota definition that improves the theoretical properties of the procedures. The method is justified by utilising a new set of axioms. We show that this method extends the Weighted inclusive Gregory method with the modified definition of quota and random equiprobable selection of a winning coalition in each iteration. The results are extended to the methods, allowing fractional numbers of votes. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0642-2

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