EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case

Franz Dietrich and Christian List

Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, vol. 40, issue 4, 1067-1095

Abstract: In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agendas of propositions it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into collective ones in accordance with the Arrow-inspired requirements of universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation, non-dictatorship and propositionwise independence. But it is only partially known (e.g., only in the monotonic case) for which agendas it is possible to respect additional requirements, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no individual veto power, or extended unanimity preservation. We fully characterize the agendas for which there are such possibilities, thereby answering the most salient open questions about propositionwise judgment aggregation. Our results build on earlier results by Nehring and Puppe (Strategy-proof social choice on single-peaked domains: possibility, impossibility and the space between, 2002 ), Nehring (Oligarchies in judgment aggregation: a characterization, 2006 ), Dietrich and List (Soc Choice Welf 29(1):19–33, 2007a ) and Dokow and Holzman (J Econ Theory 145(2):495–511, 2010a ). Copyright The Author(s) 2013

Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-012-0661-7 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:4:p:1067-1095

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().

 
Page updated 2019-11-09
Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:4:p:1067-1095