Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money

Conan Mukherjee ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, vol. 42, issue 2, 289-311

Abstract: We completely characterize the class of fair and group strategy-proof mechanisms. We consider two notions of fairness, anonymity in welfare and no-envy. Both fairness axioms, when applied with strategy-proofness, imply decision efficiency, and lead to the same class of group strategy-proof mechanisms (where the group size is restricted to two). We find that the only feasible mechanism satisfying a mild zero transfer axiom, in this class, is the Pivotal mechanism. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Anonymity in welfare; No-envy; Group strategy-proof mechanism; C72; C78; D71; D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:42:y:2014:i:2:p:289-311

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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-013-0733-3

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