Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions

Iryna Topolyan ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, vol. 42, issue 2, 465-476

Abstract: We analyze rent-seeking for a public good with two groups, where the provision of a public good is decided in the all-pay contest where “the winner takes all”. We assume that the valuation of the public good varies across groups, but is the same for all members within a group. Free-riding in such situation was predicted by Baik et al. (J Public Econ 82(3):415–429, 2001 ). We describe a continuum of equilibria where all players make contributions. There is room for substantial payoff asymmetry, which ranges from equal payoffs to all group members to a zero payoff for the player who makes a contribution and positive payoffs for free-riders. The results generalize for the case where the prize has both a private and a public component. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-013-0741-3

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