Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization

Donald Campbell () and Jerry Kelly ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, vol. 43, issue 2, 329-355

Abstract: There exist social choice rules for which every manipulation benefits everyone. This paper constructs a large variety of rules with this property and provides two characterizations of such rules. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-013-0790-7

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