Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals

Ville Korpela

Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, vol. 43, issue 3, 647-658

Abstract: We apply the idea of partial honesty, first introduced by Dutta and Sen (Game Econ Behav 74:154–169, 2012 ) in a complete information setting, to environments with incomplete information. We show that with private values and at least three individuals, incentive compatibility and no veto power are together sufficient for full implementation without any further restrictions if all individuals are partially honest. With common values, however, an additional assumption called private best alternatives is needed. This condition holds, for example, in most standard resource allocation problems Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: C72; D71; D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0792-0

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