Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains

Sidartha Gordon ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, vol. 44, issue 1, 13-29

Abstract: We provide several characterizations of unanimity decision rules, in a public choice model where preferences are constrained by attributes possessed by the alternatives (Nehring and Puppe, Games Econ Behavior 59:132–153, 2007a ; Nehring and Puppe, J Econ Theory 135:269–305, 2007b ). Solidarity conditions require that when some parameters of the economy change, the agents whose parameters are kept fixed either all weakly lose or they all weakly win. Population-monotonicity (Thomson, Math Oper Res 8:319–326, 1983a ; Thomson, J Econ Theory 31:211–226, 1983b ) applies to the arrival and departure of agents, while replacement-domination (Moulin, Q J Econ 102:769–783, 1987 ) applies to changes in preferences. We show that either solidarity property is compatible with voter-sovereignty and strategy-proofness if and only if the attribute space is quasi-median (Nehring, Social aggregation without veto, Mimeo, 2004 ), and with Pareto-efficiency if and only if the attribute space is a tree. Each of these combinations characterizes unanimity. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Solidarity; Population-monotonicity; Replacement-domination; Unanimity; Strategy-proofness; Attribute-based Domains; Generalized Single-Peaked Domains; D63; D71; H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-014-0809-8 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Unanimity in Attribute-Based Preference Domains (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:44:y:2015:i:1:p:13-29

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0809-8

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().