Robust normative comparisons of socially risky situations

Nicolas Gravel () and Benoît Tarroux

Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, vol. 44, issue 2, 257-282

Abstract: In this paper, we theoretically characterize robust empirically implementable normative criteria for evaluating socially risky situations. Socially risky situations are modeled as distributions, among individuals, of lotteries on a finite set of state-contingent pecuniary consequences. Individuals are assumed to have selfish Von Neumann–Morgenstern preferences for these socially risky situations. We provide empirically implementable criteria that coincide with the unanimity, over a reasonably large class of such individual preferences, of anonymous and Pareto-inclusive Von Neuman Morgenstern social rankings of risks. The implementable criteria can be interpreted as sequential expected poverty dominance. An illustration of the usefulness of the criteria for comparing the exposure to unemployment risk of different segments of the French and US workforce is also provided. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Date: 2015
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Related works:
Working Paper: Robust normative comparisons of socially risky situations (2015)
Working Paper: Robust normative comparisons of socially risky situations (2015)
Working Paper: Robust Normative Comparisons of Socially Risky Situations (2008)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0833-8

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