A note on the Sobolev consistency of linear symmetric values

Norman Kleinberg ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, vol. 44, issue 4, 765-779

Abstract: In van den Brink et al. (Soc Choice Welf 40:693–714, 2013 ) it is demonstrated that every $$\alpha $$ α -egalitarian value (Joosten in Dynamics, equilibria and values dissertation, Maastricht University, Maastricht, 1996 ) is consistent with respect to the well-known Sobolev reduced game function. However, the authors did not consider the question of whether or not these were the only Sobolev-consistent values. In this note we delineate, in the context of cooperative games with transferable utility and linear, symmetric and efficient values, the entire set of solutions that are consistent with respect to the Sobolev function. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0859-y

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