Extremism drives out moderation

Bettina Klose and Dan Kovenock

Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, vol. 44, issue 4, 887 pages

Abstract: This article examines the impact of the distribution of preferences on equilibrium behavior in conflicts modeled as all-pay auctions with identity-dependent externalities. Centrists and radicals are defined using a willingness-to-pay criterion that admits preferences more general than a simple ordering on the line. Extremism, characterized by a higher per capita expenditure by radicals than centrists, may persist and generate higher aggregate expenditure by radicals, even when they are relatively small in number. Our results demonstrate the importance of the institutions of conflict in determining the role of extremism and moderation in economic, political, and social environments. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Conflict; All-pay auction; Identity-dependent externalities; Radicalism; Extremism; Contest success function; D72; D74; C72; D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Extremism Drives Out Moderation (2012)
Working Paper: Extremism Drives Out Moderation (2012)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0864-1

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