Public disclosure of players’ conduct and common resources harvesting: experimental evidence from a Nairobi slum

Leonardo Becchetti, Pierluigi Conzo and Giacomo Degli Antoni ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, vol. 45, issue 1, 96 pages

Abstract: We evaluate the effect of information disclosure (feedback on individual contributions and payoffs) on players’ behavior in a multi-period common pool resource game experiment run in an area of notably scarce social capital, such as the Nairobi slum of Kibera. We document that cooperation significantly declines over rounds when such information is revealed. Our results are consistent with the Ostrom (J Econ Perspect 14:137–158, 2000 ) hypothesis that, in the absence of formal punishment rules, the availability of information about individual behavior makes common resource management more difficult and tragedy of the commons easier. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: C93; Q20; H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Working Paper: Public disclosure of players? conduct and Common Resources Harvesting: Experimental Evidence from a Nairobi Slum (2011)
Working Paper: Public disclosure of players’ conduct and Common Resources Harvesting: Experimental Evidence from a Nairobi Slum (2011)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0867-y

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