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Tagging with leisure needs

Pierre Pestieau and Maria Racionero

Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, vol. 45, issue 4, 687-706

Abstract: We study optimal redistributive taxes when individuals differ in two characteristics—earning ability and leisure needs—assumed to be imperfectly correlated. Individuals have private information about their abilities but needs are observable. With different levels of observable needs the population can be separated into groups and needs may be used as a tag. We first assume that the social planner considers individuals should be compensated for their leisure needs and characterize the optimal redistributive policy, and the extent of compensation for needs, with tagging. We also consider an alternative social objective where individuals are deemed responsible for their needs. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: H21; H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Tagging with Leisure Needs (2015)
Working Paper: Tagging with leisure needs (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Tagging with leisure needs (2010) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0875-6

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