EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Expected utility without full transitivity

Walter Bossert () and Kotaro Suzumura ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, vol. 45, issue 4, 707-722

Abstract: We generalize the classical expected-utility criterion by weakening transitivity to Suzumura consistency. In the absence of full transitivity, reflexivity and completeness no longer follow as a consequence of the system of axioms employed and a richer class of rankings of probability distributions results. This class is characterized by means of standard expected-utility axioms in addition to Suzumura consistency. An important feature of some members of our new class is that they allow us to soften the negative impact of so-called paradoxes that involve preference reversals without abandoning the expected-utility framework altogether. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-015-0876-5 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Expected utility without full transitivity (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Expected utility without full transitivity (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Expected Utility without Full Transitivity (2014) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:45:y:2015:i:4:p:707-722

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Sonal Shukla ().

 
Page updated 2017-11-18
Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:45:y:2015:i:4:p:707-722