A note on the undercut procedure

Haris Aziz ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, vol. 45, issue 4, 723-728

Abstract: The undercut procedure was presented by Brams et al. (Soc Choice Welf 39:615–631, 2012 ) as a procedure for identifying an envy-free allocation when agents have preferences over sets of objects. We point out some shortcomings of the undercut procedure. We then simplify the undercut procedure of Brams et al. and show that it works under more general conditions where agents may express indifference between objects and they may not necessarily have responsive preferences over sets of objects. Finally, we show that the procedure works even if agents have unequal claims. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: C70; D61; D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0877-4

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