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Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods

Hakan Inal

Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, vol. 45, issue 4, 745-763

Abstract: In coalition formation games where agents have preferences over coalitions to which they belong, the set of fixed points of an operator and the core of coalition formation games coincide. An acyclicity condition on preference profiles guarantees the existence of a unique core. An algorithm using that operator finds all core partitions whenever there exists one. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: C78; C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0879-2

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