Efficient extensions of the Myerson value

Sylvain Béal, André Casajus () and Frank Huettner ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, vol. 45, issue 4, 819-827

Abstract: We study values for transferable utility games enriched by a communication graph (CO-games) where the graph does not necessarily affect the productivity but can influence the way the players distribute the worth generated by the grand coalition. Thus, we can envisage values that are efficient instead of values that are component efficient. For CO-games with connected graphs, efficiency and component efficiency coincide. In particular, the Myerson value (Myerson in Math Oper Res 2:22–229, 1977 ) is efficient for such games. Moreover, fairness is characteristic of the Myerson value. We identify the value that is efficient for all CO-games, coincides with the Myerson value for CO-games with connected graphs, and satisfies fairness. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: 91A12; C71; D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0885-4

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