Codecision in context: implications for the balance of power in the EU

Nicola Maaser () and Alexander Mayer ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, vol. 46, issue 1, 213-237

Abstract: The paper analyzes the European Union’s codecision procedure as a bargaining game between the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. The relative influence of these institutions on legislative decision-making in the EU is assessed under a priori preference assumptions. In contrast to previous studies, we do not consider the codecision procedure in isolation but include several aspects of the EU’s wider institutional framework. The finding that the Council is more influential than the Parliament due to its more conservative internal decision rule is robust to adding ‘context’ to the basic model, but the imbalance is considerably attenuated. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Keywords: C70; D72; D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0910-7

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